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ON THE UNITY OF THE PRAGMATIC MOVEMENT 
by Charles Morris 
William James stressed in his Pragmatism that "the one" and "the 
" are not contradictory categories by showing how the universe may 
e in some respects and many in others. This insight applies to the 
matic movement as well. To claim that there is an underlying unity 
e movement is not to deny that there are important differences 
ween the major pragmatists, differences in their problems, their em- 
ses, and even in some of their doctrines. The pragmatic movement, 
the universe, is "one" in certain respects and "many" in other re- 
ts. The present essay aims to investigate the sense in which Ameri- 
n pragmatism is a unitary philosophic movement. 
This task requires some guiding conception of what constitutes a philos- 
Since the term "philosophy" is today explicated in many, and 
opposing, ways, it is necessary to choose some conception of 
osophy to serve as a reference point for the analysis. A quite tra- 
onal point of view will be chosen: a philosophy, as a conception of 
the cosmos and man's place in it, includes a cosmology, a theory of 
value (axiology), and the acceptance of a certain method for conduct- 
ing inquiry (epistemology and logic). Such a conception of philosophy is 
only one possible conception among many. Its choice is not, however, 
capricious, since it reflects a position, made explicit by the Stoics, which 
has dominated much of the history of philosophy, I t  will be claimed 
that the pragmatic movement has a cosmology, axiology, and method- 
ology, and that these are integrated into a distinctive philosophical orien- 
tation through an actional or behavioral theory of signs (semiotic). The 
stated conception of philosophy provides the framework for the follow- 
ing analysis. The problem of the unity (or disunity) of the pragmatic 
movement would, of course, take different forms if other conceptions 
of philosophy were chosen. 
e must now ask what is the distinctive focus of attention of the 
rican pragmatists. That the basic focus is upon human action is 
(109) 
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unmistakable: the pragmatists are centralIy concerned with man as ac. 
tor. They are not, however, concerned with human action in all its as- 
pects. As philosophers they center their attention upon thinking man, 
and hence upon reflective or deliberative action. Their approach to think- 
ing man has certain characteristic features. 
There is a clear post-Darwinian evolutionary undertone, a sense for the 
living creature in its physical and social background. Evolutionary bi- 
ology inevitably raised the question as to thc nature of mind, thought, 
and intelligence when approached within the evolutionary framework- 
and pragmatism may in part be conceived as a sustained attempt to an- 
swer this question. 
Secondly, the acceptance of the evolutionary framework went along 
with a rejection of the traditional mind-body dualism. The pragmatists 
were from the beginning anti-Cartesian, and constitute one phase of what 
Arthur Lovejoy called the "revolt against dualism." The tendency to 
think of mentality as a form of action increasingly dominated their think- 
ing. Finally, there is in all the pragmatists a great respect for scientific 
method, and the belief that philosophy was to aIign itself as far as pos- 
sible with the scientific enterprise; even if the task of philosophy was 
not to be identified with that of science, it was not to be conceived in 
opposition to science. 
The pra,matists' account of reflective human action was at the level 
of ordinary observation and was not based on experiment, but it was 
empirical in intent and direction. It is for this reason that the pragmatic 
orientation helped prepare the way for later developments in the be- 
havioral sciences. 
So oriented, the inquiry into thinking man led directly to the central 
place of the topic of meaning within the movement. Charles Peirce 
wished that philosophy become observational and cumulative like science, 
and so in effect proposed that philosophers use language as the scientist 
does. The oft-quoted statement of Peirce must bear quotation again: 
For "the typical experimentalist, you will find that whatever assertion 
you may make to him, he will either understand as meaning that if a 
given prescription for an experiment can be and ever is carried out 
in act, an experience of a given description will result, or else he will 
see no sense at all in what you say." This is to affirm that to an ex- 
perimentaI scientist a sign signifies that if one acts in a certaiiz kind of 
way a certain kind of experience will result. 
The emphasis here is on the intrinsic relation of action and expe- 
rience, an emphasis which brings together the actional and thc empiri- 
cal orientations of the pragmatists. Now this formulation is not the full 
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ry of Peirce's account of signs (or "meanings"), but it does form what 
ht be called the "hard core" of the pragmatic position. I t  is ac- 
ed, with some differences of emphasis, by all the major pragmatists; 
even where there are doubts as to the sufficiency of the "hard 
re" formulation, all the pragmatists accept the view that signs function 
thin, and must be interpreted with respect to, action. This actional 
ry of signs (or "meanings"), this behavioral semiotic, is the central 
ying principle of the pragmatic movement, and one of its most 
inal contributions. This does not mean that such a behavioral semi- 
c was the historical starting point of the major pragmatists, nor that 
ir interest in the relation of signs ("meanings") to action was every- 
ere the same, nor indeed that a sufficiently comprehensive behav- 
semiotic was ever formulated by any of the main builders of the 
matic movement. 
eirce expressed the conviction that the main features of his (and 
') thought would have been substantially the same if the prag- 
maxim of meaning had never been formulated. His main logical 
d cosmological ideas preceded his papers on pragmatism. Pragmatism 
for him essentially a formulation of the criterion for admissible 
potheses if one works within an essentially scientific mode of thought. 
s general analysis and classification of signs was originally explicated 
th reference to his metaphysical categories of Firstness, Secondness, 
d Thirdness, and it was never brought into a clear relation to his 
formulation of pragmatism. It  was not even "behavioral" in its 
nal form; only in a late paper, unpublished in his lifetime, did he 
plicitly defend the position that in the final analysis the interpretant 
a sign (the effect on the interpreter in virtue of which something is 
sign) was a habit or disposition to respond. He never reworked his 
miotic from this point of view; he never gave a detailed exposition of 
is late point of view with respect to many kinds of signs (such as mathe- 
atical and normative terms); he never raised the question as to how far 
earlier metaphysical categories and doctrines were compatible with his 
behavioral analysis of the interpretant of a sign. 
Peirce, therefore, cannot be said to have presented a systematic and 
mprehensive behavioral semiotic. But his analysis in the pragmatic 
axim of an inseparable relation of action and experience (in signs with 
"rational purport"), and his view that the interpretants of such signs 
e habits or  dispositions to action, clearly are foundation stones of a 
havioral semiotic. Even his belief that there is a level of meaning in 
ition <o that formulated in the pragmatic maxim (such as in the mean- 
of certain religious terms) still connects such meaning with action: 
e meaning of such terms is stated to lie in their contribution to ra- 
nal self-controlled conduct. Even here meaning is explicated with ref- 
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erence to action. In this sense Peirce can be said to have moved toward 
a consistently behavioral conception of signs. 
The situation is much the same with William James, but because of 
James' special moral and religious problems, there are some differences 
of emphasis. James in a sense begins where Peirce ends, by giving a 
slightly different interpretation of Peirce's pragmatic maxim. In this 
maxim, as we have seen, Peirce stressed the necessary relation of action 
and experience in the meaning of signs with "rational purport." Jamesy 
own formulation of Peirce's pragmatic maxim is in terms of "what sen- 
sations we are to expect . . . , and what reactions we must prepare." 
Here there is not an essential relation but merely a conjunction of "sen- 
sations" and "reactions," and in some formuIations the relation is even 
weaker: "or" takes the place of "and," In this looser formulation James 
can admit as meaningful doctrines which affect the action of their in- 
terpreters even if these doctrines do not predict specific perceptual ex- 
periences-and he gives certain metaphysical and religious doctrines as 
examples. Peirce had come to essentially the same result, but only by 
admitting a level of meaning over and above that formulated in the "hard 
core" pragmatic maxim; James reaches this position by a looser formu- 
lation of the pragmatic maxim itself. In both Peirce and James the mean- 
ing of signs is consistently viewed in the context of human action. 
George H. Mead did not refer to Peirce or to James in the pre- 
sentation of his analysis of meaning. His orientation, however, is dis- 
tinctly and unqualifiedly behavioral. Of all the pragmatists, Mead is most 
seriously concerned with developing a general theory of human action. 
His particular contribution to a behavioral semiotic is his stress upon the 
basically social character of both nonlinguistic signs and the linguistic 
signs which are built upon them as a foundation. Human action is for 
him in origin social action. The first human signs arise when the be- 
ginning of a response of one person is reacted to by another person 
as an indication of later stages in the response of the first person. Mead 
called these "nonsignificant symbols"; they became "significant symbols" 
(or language symbols) when vocally produced sounds, operating in this 
context, carried the same indication to the person making the sound that 
it did to others who heard the sound and interpreted it by the tendencies 
to action which it provoked. The interpretant of a sign is thus for Mead 
-as for the later Peirce-a disposition to action occasioned by the sign. 
Mead, however, spelled out in detail, in a way that Peirce did not, the 
social context in which language originated and operated. 
John Dewey takes over much of Mead's analysis. He extends the 
approach by a more explicit treatment of signs in art, and the norma- 
tive signs that occur in evaluations. C. I. Lewis (whose orientation is 
to Peirce rather than to Mead) is especially concerned with the mean- 
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g of judgments of value and judgments of obligation. Some further ref- 
rence to value terms will be made in later pages. Here it is sufficient 
note that the later pragmatists, whether influenced more by Peirce or 
Mead, extend, but continue to build upon, the behavioral analysis of 
eaning characteristic of the pragmatic movement from its beginning. 
111 
The stress upon the behavioral functioning of signs is closely related 
e guiding interest of the pragmatists in reflecting or inquiring man. 
underlines a second unifying theme of the pragmatic movement: 
ehavioral theory of inquiry. Inquiry, as the attempt at the reflective 
tion of a problem, is carried on by means of signs (signs of course 
not function only in inquiry). Inquiry is itseIf seen as a form of ac- 
on, a phase of action to solve problems within a wider course of action 
which it is embedded. As a form of action, inquiry can of course 
counter problems within its own development, and so there arises in- 
ry to deal with problems which arise in inquiry. To this extent in- 
ry can become autonomous (to use Dewey's term), as it does to a 
rge degree in mathematics and theoretical science. But in the main, in- 
uiry is for the sake of first-level problems encountered in the action 
f the living creature in its physical and social environment. Inquiry 
ultimately for the sake of such actions. Inquiry into inquiry is only a 
ecial form of inquiry, and hence of action, 
Such an account of inquiry seems to me to present views common to 
irce, Mead, and Dewey. The importance for the pragmatic movement 
such a behavioral theory of inquiry can be made evident by the fol- 
wing considzrations. 
In the first place, on this account, the occurrence of inquiry presup- 
oses the existence of behaving organisms and an environing world which 
various ways supports and hinders their activities. It therefore presup- 
ses a level of behavior antecedent to reflective or inquiring behavior, 
which inquiry arises and to which it ministers. Similarly, inquiry into 
itself presupposes the occurrence of a body of inquiries which 
utes its own subject matter. 
Next, it is evident that this behavioral stress upon inquiry has close 
ections with the pragmatist approach to the topic of truth. It is natu- 
to look at truth in terms of inquiry, as, for instance, a property of 
which in a process of reflection resolve the problem which was 
occasion, and hence permit the ongoing of the behavior in which 
arose. If signs with "intellectual purport" signify, in the narrower 
ean formulation, that such and such would be observed consequent 
such and such action, then signs whose predictions are fulfilled 
ght well be called "truev-either in the case of a particular inquiry 
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or more generally in the case of a prolonged and continuing inquiry 
which extends over many (and perhaps an endless number of) specific 
problems of a common sort. This, of course, is not intended as a full 
account of the pragmatists' treatment of truth (for there are many dif- 
ferences in the various analyses) but to suggest that a common denom- 
inator is found in locating the problem of truth within the context of 
a behavioral theory of inquiry. If signs are behavioral at the core, then 
the "correspondence" of signs to "reality" must be restated in terms of 
the relation of signs to the total process of behavior-in-an-environment in 
which they occur. 
In the third place, while Peirce admitted a number of forms of in- 
quiry, he held that the scientific form of inquiry is superior to the others 
in that it is cooperative in nature and inherently self-corrective. While it 
would not follow from this that the solution of all problems must be 
sought through the scientific mode of inquiry, or even that all problems 
can be solved through such inquiry, a11 of the pragmatists do share 
Peirce's esteem for scientific inquiry and advocate its extension to a range 
of human problems. 
In terms of these considerations it becomes evident that the direction 
of the pragmatic analysis has been to replace the traditional epistemol- 
ogy, in whole or in part, by the theory of inquiry. Epistemology in its 
Western postmedieval form was connected with a mind-body dualism, 
experience was regarded as mental and private, and the task of the theory 
of knowledge was to show how the thinking individual could come to 
know the material world and other minds-or why he could not do this. 
The pragmatist has held that the individual never finds himself in this 
predicament-that problems always arise within an area of the unproblern- 
atic, and that accordingly "the existence of the world" can never be- 
come a problem for knowledge. The theory of knowledge, to repeat, is 
replaced (in whole or in part) by a behavioral theory of inquiry. Such 
a development is one of the novel themes of the pragmatic movement. 
It  may be noted in passing that a similar shift occurs in the interpre- 
tation of logic. In a wide sense logic is regarded as part of the theory 
of signs (Peirce). The formal principIes of logic are regarded by Dewey 
and Lewis as derived from successful inquiry and held as norms for the 
further prosecution of inquiry: Lewis speaks of them as "pragmatically 
a priori" and Dewey as "operationally a priori," both using these terms 
with respect to the conduct of inquiry. 
IV 
It is not easy to name satisfactorily the third characteristic theme of 
the pragmatic movement: it is the approach to axiology (to values and 
evahiations) in terms o f  preferential behavior. None of the pragmatists 
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the term "preferential behavior." But it may serve as 
what Dewey referred to as "selective-rejective 
had called "demands," and what R. B. Perry 
ames) spoke of as "interests." Preferential behavior, 
hly characterized, is action which tends to favor or disfavor one ob- 
(thing, situation, idea, behavior) rather than another. It is positive 
ferential behavior if the object is favored; negative preferential behav- 
if the object is disfavored. A preferential-behavior axiology attempts 
locate all values and evaluations within the context of preferential 
that in this sense the axiology of pragmatism 
r axiology, even though this label was not ap- 
s here under consideration. 
There are of course various ways in which the term "value" can be 
ect to preferential behavior. It  might be suggested 
e is any object of positive preferential behavior. 
es seems to do this in holding that the essence of value is to satisfy 
ater explicitly did in giving as the generic meaning 
"val~e" "any object of any interest." I think this position is found in 
I. Lewis who finds the meaning of "immediate value" in the liking 
erring of some contents of immediate experience (other things hav- 
positional sense of their capacity to lead to such 
ericnces). Dewey's position would limit the term 
alue" to those objects of positive preferentia1 behavior which continue 
be favored after a consideration of the consequences of favoring 
ese differences in the range of denotation of the 
all these pragmatists appear to interpret value with respect to what 
rential behavior. 
approach may be regarded as eventuations of those 
uiries where the problem concerns what is to be favored as an object 
or. If all inquiry occurs within an area of the un- 
matic, then value inquiries (in the distinctive normative sense) may 
arded as inquiries concerning values which occur within an area of 
and which can be completed only with respect to 
alues. Inquiries as to what objects and experiences 
or inquiries as to the capacity of objects to arouse 
ustain preferences, are not normative value inquiries in this distinc- 
sense, for the resolution of the inquiry involves no judgments made 
he basis of unproblematic values. C. I. Lewis' "judgments of value" 
) seem in this sense to be nonnormative, while his 
n"' (or judgments of ought) seem to be distinc- 
ortant differences of emphasis in the axiology of the 
s. Nevertheless, the distinctive mark of pragmatic axiol- 
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ogy seems to lie in the approach to the topics of value and evaluations 
within the context of preferential behavior. When so approached, it seems 
to me that terms referring to values remain meaningful within the prag- 
matic theory of meaning, and that evaluations fall within the general 
pragmatic theory of inquiry. One can, if one wishes, limit "scientific in- 
quiry" to nonnormative inquiry, and in this case distinctively normative 
inquiries are not scientific; but this decision should not obscure the fact 
that the main difference between scientific and normative inquiries lies in 
the fact that in (distinctively) normative inquiries it is preferential be- 
havior that has become problematic and that the resolution of such value 
problems is always done with respect to unproblematic values. Since care- 
ful normative inquiry will need to take account of the results of non- 
normative inquiries, no limit can be set to the potential importance of 
science in the furthering and improving of man's value decisions. 
A fourth unifying doctrine in the pragmatic movement may be called 
the semiosical conception of mind. "Semiosis" is the term used by Peirce 
for a sign process; semiotic is then the study of semiosis. To hoId that 
mental processes can be regarded as sign processes can then be called 
the semiosical conception of mind. On this view mind is not regarded as 
a substance, nor is mentality regarded as the intrinsic nature of any prop- 
erty or event-thus experience as such is not regarded as mental. Ex- 
perience is mental only to the extent that signs are operating within it, 
that is, to  the extent that behavior is sign-behavior. Neither the sign it- 
self (the sign-vehicle), nor the sign's interpretant (as a disposition to 
respond in a certain way caused by the sign), nor the object signified is 
as such intrinsically mental; it is the semiosical process as a whole that 
is called mental. To say that an organism has a mind is to say that signs 
are operating in its behavior. 
Peirce had maintained that mind is a sign developing according to the 
laws of inference. James had written that consciousness as a stuff did not 
exist, but only processes in which one aspect of experience functioned as 
substitute or sign for other portions of experience. Mead did not equate 
mentality with all sign processes, but only with signs which he called 
"significant symbolsm-signs which had the same signification to their pro- 
ducers and their interpreters, a view which restricted mentality to or- 
ganisms that engaged in language behavior. There are obvious differ- 
ences in these various views, but their common core is in linking mind 
and mentality with the occurrence of sign processes. 
There remains the problem of the pragmatist cosmology. The term 20s- 
ON THE UNITY OF THE PRAGMATIC MOVEMENT 117 
ology" seems preferable in this connection to the term "metaphysics." 
e latter term was indeed used by Peirce, James, Dewey, and Lewis. 
wever, Dewey later withdrew the term as applicable to his views, 
ead tended to use the term as a term of disparagement, and Lewis 
eant by the term an analysis of basic categories and not a concern for 
smology. So the term "metaphysics" is hardly an appropriate term for 
t is here under consideration. 
egardless of terminology, pragmatism has a place for cosmology con- 
ed as an empirically based study of generic characteristics of the 
mos. For the pragmatists, as we have seen, the "world that is there," 
e experienced world," is not regarded as a whole as mental, subjec- 
e, or private-these latter terms being used to describe only certain fea- 
res of the world that is there. Accordingly, there is no general problem 
the "existence of the world": since for the pragmatists problems arise 
ly within a context which is unproblematic, there is no context within 
hich the "world that is there" could as a whole become a problem. 
is then, from this point of view, legitimate to attempt to characterize 
a1 features of the world, provided that this can be done in 
application can be controlled by observation of this world. 
thls sense there can be a pragmatist cosmology, which would differ 
generality from the particular and partial accounts of the world fur- 
hed by the special sciences. 
It is, however, difficult to find a phrase which clearly signifies a con- 
ption of the cosmos common to all pragmatists. Here indeed the dif- 
rences between the pragmatists loom very large: Peirce's "objective ideal- 
" James7 "world of pure experience," Dewey's "cultural naturalism" 
ses in point. And if we say that the pragmatic cosmology is "evolu- 
nary7' or "temporalistic" or "activistic," then it can be replied that 
se are not traits distinctive of the pragmatist cosmology since they have 
en emphasized by other cosmologists as well. It  might seem, accord- 
y, that in the cosmological area the thesis of the unity of the prag- 
ic movement breaks down. 
I do not believe, however, that this is the case. For if human reflective 
vior is as the pragmatist maintains it to be, then such behavior is 
part of the cosmos, and the rest of the cosmos must be such as 
permit the occurrence of such behavior. Since such behavior occurs 
the world that is there, it is legitimate to attempt to describe certain 
nerd characteristics of that world, and to note what features of the 
smos are required to make such behavior possible. 
Peirce held that the most general characters of the cosmos were ex- 
essed in the three categories Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness- 
ich correspond in part to the notions of possibility, existence, and law 
habit). These were seen as pervasive cosmological traits; while all 
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were "real," possibilities and laws did not "exist" in Peirce's sense of ex- 
istence, since existence for Peirce involved dynamic interactions which 
were only possible between particular things. Peirce supported his doc- 
trine of the categories by phenomenological observation, by appeal to the 
results of the special sciences, and by the analysis of certain features 
of sign processes (which as themselves real could be used as the basis 
for hypothetical generalizations about the cosmos as a whole). In regard 
to the latter point, Peirce argued that analysis disclosed three, and only 
three, forms of propositions, and these served to express the three char- 
acteristics of Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness. 
While other pragmatists do not use Peirce's terminology nor his par- 
ticular method of analysis, I think it can be argued that the cosmo- 
logical views of all the pragmatists find a place for possibilities, existences, 
and laws (or habits). Insofar as this could be maintained, it could be 
held that a fifth unifying doctrine of the pragmatic movement is the cos- 
mological doctrine of the reality of possibility, existence, and law (01. 
habit). 
Rather than support this position by reference to the various prag- 
matists I will show that the reality of possibilities, existences, and laws 
(or habits) is revealed in the analysis of reflective intelligence upon which 
all the pragmatists focus their attention. Since other philosophers might 
well hold the cosmoIogica1 doctrine in question, this particular approach 
iC views will link the pragmatic version of this doctrine with the pragmat' 
of action and reflection. 
If action occurs within a world which facilitates or blocks the course 
of action, this is a clear case of Peirce's Secondness. If reflective behavior 
or inquiry serves to advance blocked action by a consideration of al- 
ternatives for the continuation of such action, then we have an in- 
stance of Peirce's Firstness-an instance of the reality of possibilities. 
And if signs essential to the conduct of inquiry involve dispositions to 
action as their interpretants, this is a case of Peirce's Thirdness-the 
reality of laws or habits. Since all the pragmatists hold a similar view 
of human reflection and an actional theory of signs, they could accept 
this analysis as suppo~t  for the cosmology under consideration. 
It  may of course be asked about the justification of applying to the 
cosmos at large traits revealed in an analysis of human reflective action. 
The only answer open to the pragmatists would be to admit (as did 
Peirce) that this is indeed a hypothesis, subject to control by further in- 
quiry. 
This cosmological model is based upon a consideration of what is in- 
volved in human reflective action. If this basis is to be generalized, then 
terms such as "action in a world" must be generalized so that human 
action becomes only one form of action. Mead attempts to do this in 
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his generalized usage of such terms as "perspective," "system," "social- 
ity," and "emergence." In his cosmology human reflective intelligence be- 
comes one complex emergent level of processes which in a generalized 
form appear in nonhuman organisms and in the inorganic world. There 
are problems as to how far Mead succeeds in this ambitious attempt, the 
detailed elaboration of which was prevented by his unexpected death. 
Whatever may be thought of Mead's success, it is of great theoretical in- 
terest to attempt to construct a cosmological theory on a biosocial basis, 
in contrast to the basis in physics which has been the starting point of 
most modem cosmological models. 
One point may be added. Peirce called his cosmology an "objective 
idealism," while Dewey's (and Mead's) cosmology is a form of "natural- 
ism." The ground for this difference is worth noting. Peirce's idealism 
is supported by his interpretation of all forms of Thirdness as essentially 
semiosical. Since he applied the term "mind" to all sign processes, mind 
became a general cosmological category; and since he thought cosmic 
evolution moved by Thirdness converting Firstness into determinate forms 
of Secondness, mind became for him the dominant form of reality. But 
for Mead (and for Dewey) "mind" is restricted to certain high-level sign 
processes, and has no such dominant cosmological position that it had 
in Peirce. Hence an "idealistic" cosmology is supplanted by a "natural- 
istic" one. The issues here depend on the interpretation of the doctrine. 
of continuity. Peirce at times calls continuity a methodological doctrine, 
but in general he converts it into a cosmological doctrine. Mead's ac- 
ceptance of emergence permits discontinuities to be as basic (as "real") 
as continuities, and certain symbolic processes (and hence mind) are at- 
tributed to man alone, even though these sign processes emerge in evo- 
lution from animal sign processes of a simpler, nonlinguistic sort. Hence 
for Mead no cosmoIogical idealism results. 
VII 
Such in outline is the argument of this essay that the pragmatic move- 
ment has an underlying unity. It reveals a number of common themes 
in its doctrines of epistemology as the theory of inquiry, axiology as the 
study of preferential behavior, and cosmology as the doctrine of the 
reality of Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness. The doctrine of the semi- 
osical nature of mind may be included within cosmology. It  was further 
argued that all of these doctrines were linked with a behavioral semi- 
otic, elaborated in the context of inquiry into the nature of human re- 
flection. Except in one instance, attention has not been paid to the dif- 
ferences among pragmatists, nor the reasons for these differences. But 
this would be another study. 
